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Abstract
In this paper we analyze market segmentation by firm size in the commercial real
estate transaction process. Using novel micro-level data, we look at the probabil-
ity distribution of investors acquiring a specific bundle of real estate characteristics,
distinguishing between investors based on the size of their real estate portfolio. We
find evidence of market segmentation by investor size: institutional investors seg-
ment across property characteristics based on the size of their real estate portfolio.
The probability that a large (small) seller will sell a property to a similar-sized buyer
is higher, keeping all else equal. We explore potential drivers of this market segmen-
tation and find that it is mainly driven by investor preferences. During the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC), large investors were less likely to buy the ‘average’ property,
as compared to the period before or after the crisis, indicating time-varying investor
preferences.
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Introduction
Around 90% of investible commercial real estate in the United States is owned and
traded in private markets (Ling and Archer 2008; Fisher et al. 2009). Anecdotal evi-
dence from real estate practitioners suggests that since early 2000s private real estate
markets have experienced significant inflows of institutional capital. Institutional1
investors play an important role not only in mainstream asset markets, but also in
direct real estate. However, given their dominance, not enough is known about the
interplay among institutional investors on commercial real estate markets. Given the
significant heterogeneity among institutional investors in real estate and the illiquid
nature of the asset class, we are provided with a natural laboratory to analyse the
matching between buyers and sellers and the investment preferences of these market
players.
Unlike the transaction process in residential real estate, a commercial transaction
is larger in value and does not take place in an auction. Instead, the process is rather
less transparent and not always the highest bidder would be chosen (see Chinloy et al.
2013). This can result in market segmentation in commercial real estate markets.
Some preliminary evidence by Geltner and van de Minne (2017) and Cvijanović et al.
(2020) suggests that the law of one price may be violated with different investors
paying different prices for a comparable property.
Given the nature of the direct real estate asset class, market segmentation can be
present when there is asymmetric information about the property or the actors; other
drivers of segmentation in real estate markets can be associated with differences in
bargaining power, economies of scale for large players, and style investing. Market
segmentation can also be enhanced by the nature commercial real estate is transacted,
in that brokers advertise certain types of properties to certain investor clienteles.
Another way that segmentation can be propagated is through knowledge networks of
investors who prefer to trade with each other only.
In this paper we explore if market segmentation exists by looking at whether the
size of the investor plays a role in their preferences for commercial real estate. More
specifically, we assess the probability that an investor of a certain size purchases a
specific ‘bundle’ of real estate characteristics.
Using a rich micro-level data set on a universe of commercial real estate trans-
actions enables us to observe the dynamics of buying and selling at the individual
property level and allows us to try to answer the following questions: 1) Do insti-
tutional buyers and sellers segment based on the size of their real estate portfolio?
What is the probability that a specific property is bought by a large or small investor?
2) What kind of properties do institutional investors choose to buy based on prop-
erty’s size, quality, Net Operating Income (NOI) and other characteristics? 3) Is there
a time- and geographical variation in the distribution of investors across properties?
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Institutional investors seg-
ment across property characteristics based on the size of their real estate portfolio.
1We refer to institutional investors for all investors who are not retail investors, including developers,
owners and operators.
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Large investors tend to buy large properties, properties with higher NOI, properties
of high quality, young properties, and properties located close to the Central Busi-
ness District (CBD). The reverse is true for small investors. (2) The probability that
a large seller will sell a property to a similar-sized buyer is higher than to other size
quantiles. (3) Exploring this segmentation we conclude that it is most likely driven
by investor preferences or different riskiness of real estate and investor styles, rather
than i.e. financial constraints, based on evidence from variations in net operating
income (NOI). This is validated by using bilateral buyer-seller matching pairs. (4)
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), large investors were less likely to buy the
‘average’ property on the market as compared to the period before or after the crisis.
Moreover, the size of the average investor declined across all states during the GFC.
This finding implies that the presence of large institutional investors may exacerbate
the real estate cycle leading to faster decline in property values during a downturn.
Importantly, it also highlights time-variation in investor preferences.
The classic financial constraints literature highlights the importance of size as a
proxy for such constraints. For example, small investors may be more likely to buy
small properties as they may face binding financial constraints and/or operational
limits, and as such tend to be priced out of the larger deals, thus perpetuating mar-
ket segmentation. In addition, small investors can face barriers to entry as brokers
advertise certain properties only to select investor clienteles.
The opposite is true for large players. Large investors may be more likely to buy
large, centrally located, “safe” properties. One explanation for this can be that large
investors do not have the required in-house management expertise or capacity to
manage a large portfolio of numerous small properties. Liquidity and liquidation
constraints can also play a role, in that transaction costs associated with liquidation
of a diversified portfolio can be high. Previous research by Ghent (2018) shows that
delegated and direct investors have different preferences for liquidity and hence may
have an effect on the overall liquidity of a certain market. Therefore, large investors
may behave like delegated investors with size of the investor providing an important
dimension for segmentation.
Market segmentation by investor size may also be associated with different risk
attitudes and investor styles. The latter would mean that large investors may prefer to
invest in the ‘core’ properties, while small investors may position themselves so that
they invest in ‘opportunistic’ real estate. That may be related to small investors poten-
tially having a well developed local network and not be as diversified as large players.
Therefore, large investors may be seen as picking rather ‘safe’ (‘core’) investments.
While those property classifications have been widely used to describe investment
styles for real assets, the definition of those risk profiles is highly subjective. In this
paper we shed some light on this debate in the context of investor characteristics.
A significant contribution of the paper is the methodology we use to account for
market segmentation. We use ordered logistic models in which real estate investors
are grouped into different size quantiles and assess what is the probability that a
property is bought by a certain investor size quantile (ISQ). More specifically, we
follow Donald et al. (2000) by estimating a quantile model in a survival framework.
While this method has not been used in real estate research, its application is common
in labor economics. The methodology we use provides a way to conduct a logit-style
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regression with a large number of categories—the size quantiles. We also model the
buyer and seller side of the transaction simultaneously and account for property-level
net operating income (NOI).
A further contribution is the construction of investor total real estate portfolio
values which we further break down into investor size quantiles (ISQs). We use data
from Real Capital Analytics (RCA) from 2002 and 2018. The ISQs are constructed
by taking the average sales price of the target properties and building a balanced
panel of price estimates for every year and every property. We subsequently link the
information about the investor (buyer and seller) of a property and add up the total
real estate portfolio value of every investor for every year to get to the investor size.
The paper is organized as follows: we discuss the relevant literature in
Section “Literature Review”. Section “Methodology” described the empirical
methodology, while in Section “Data and Descriptive Statistics” we describe the data.
In Section “Results” we discuss the results and in Section “Concluding Remarks” we
conclude.
Literature Review
Our paper relates to several strands of research. One strand of literature focuses on
segmentation. Ghent (2018) assesses what makes an asset institutional quality and
shows that delegated investors—those acting on behalf of their clients—invest in
cities with high turnover. She argues that the reason for this is that those investors
value liquidity more in the sense that they are not necessarily buy-and-hold investors
and hence prefer to invest in more liquid markets. This heterogeneity in preferences
for liquidity leads to market segmentation by investor type. This has a feedback effect
on liquidity with market segmentation affecting the liquidity on the markets.
Ling et al. (2018) study the transaction prices of commercial real estate by com-
paring how those differ based on the distance of the investor from the property in
question. They find that distant investors face higher search costs and information
asymmetries as compared to local investors.
Related to this is the literature on how market segmentation affects prices on real
estate markets. Clayton et al. (2009) talk about real estate markets being highly seg-
mented in which mispricing can be observed which they contribute to sentiment and
the lack of sophisticated traders. Fisher et al. (2009) investigate how institutional
capital flows affect returns in private real estate markets. They find that unlike what
theory predicts, capital flows do affect returns in those markets due the the high seg-
mentation. They also argue that in addition to capital flows creating price pressure
in segmented real estate markets, they may also affect investor expectations. That
would mean that an increase in capital flows into a sector or market could act as a
signal that investors are revising upwards their expectations regarding future income
streams which may lead to higher asset prices. Beracha et al. (2018) find that hotel
properties are segmented by hotel class arguing that the notion of aggregate pricing
models bunching properties by their type would bias estimators.
Sagi (2017) and Badarinza et al. (2018) use search models to explain returns on the
real estate markets. Sagi (2017) focuses on the property-specific part of the returns
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as a large number of investors hold small portfolios and may be affected by idiosyn-
cratic risks. So, for small investors, understanding what drives idiosyncratic returns
is important. He develops a model in which he allows for investors to vary in their
valuations of the income stream of properties and shows that returns are not gener-
ated by a random walk process which may be explained by the illiquidity of the asset.
Piazzesi et al. (Forthcoming) also use a search model to study segmented housing
markets due to heterogeneous clients. In particular they analyse the search behav-
ior of buyers and how integrated different housing segments are. They observe that
there are two types of searchers—narrow ones and broader ones, that span over sev-
eral segments—which may be interested in areas with different levels of inventory.
They find that the broad searchers spread local shocks across segments and reduce
the effects of local market activity.
Geltner and van deMinne (2017) run a quantile regression to estimate price indices
for different price segments. They aim to analyse if the law of one price in real estate
markets which may be violated as different investors may be willing to pay differ-
ent prices for the same product. They find that different price point properties have
different return-risk dynamics and momentum.
Another strand of research related to the one above is the literature on style invest-
ing in stock markets. There is extensive literature that shows that small stocks are
prices differently to large stocks and investors price size in. Another way to look at it
is, given that in direct real estate there are large information asymmetries, large insti-
tutional investors may decide to adopt style investing if they cannot, or are not willing
to, make decisions based on the fundamentals of the building and the location. Bar-
beris and Shleifer (2003) argue that investors may allocate funds not at the asset level
but at the style level, meaning the assets are first grouped into categories—styles—
and then a decision is made based on relative past performance rather than on absolute
performance. Froot and Teo (2008) show that retail and institutional investors indeed
allocate capital at the style level and the way they classify assets is by using size and
value-growth dimensions. Value investors would buy cheap stocks which are asso-
ciated with higher risk. Growth investors would buy more expensive stocks which
are perceived as less risky. Similar to the stock market, institutional investors in real
estate may also follow a specific style. Real estate investors can be classified into core
or stabilized investors versus opportunistic investors. Core investors prefer low-risk
low-return property, meaning a property with stable NOI for which they are prepared
to accept low cap rate. Such investors may be large investors in terms of portfolio
size. Opportunistic investors may be smaller firms that would buy cheaper proper-
ties which have high cap rates and low NOI. While we do not look at the effect of
prices, as is not the focus of this paper, the literature that shows how different types
of investors affect pricing is relevant to explain the rationale.
Methodology
Our main objective is to estimate the probability that a certain investor size purchases
a specific bundle of real estate characteristics. The size is based on the dollar value
of the current domestic real estate portfolio which is presented in the form of a full
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panel of real estate portfolio values for every year for every company operating in
the US. Investor size is a continuous variable in itself, and a hedonic analysis could
be done following (Rosen 1974). However, we choose to subdivide the continuous
variable into multiple investor size quantiles (ISQs). We do this for multiple reasons.
First of all, we are interested in probability distributions of different ISQs purchasing
certain properties rather than point estimates. In other words, we are not interested
in one linear prediction, but in the entire probability density function (pdf). From
a modelling point of view, this also makes more intuitive sense, given that we are
talking about preference or “choice” models.
Finally, given the high variance in investor sizes, we also expect considerable non-
linearities. Breaking up our investor sizes allows us to analyze such non-linearities.2
We compute the quantiles as follows. Firstly, we demean our full panel of investor
sizes for every year. Next—and again for every period separately—we number the
investors (from the smallest portfolio to the largest) from q = 1, 2, . . . ,Q. We follow
Donald et al. (2000) in that we group the first 5% and the largest 5%, and use 1%
increments in between. This results in 92 quantile buckets.
Then we proceed to estimate an ordered multinomial logistic model, which is also
referred to as a proportional odds model. Such models are given by
logit(γij ) = log γij
1 − γij = θj + Xiβ. (1)
where property i has probability γ to be bought by ISQ j . In this formulation θj is
a constant representing the baseline value of the transformed cumulative probability
for ISQ j .X is a matrix of covariates for property i, and β is the corresponding vector
of parameter estimates. It is custom to choose β1 = 0 for identification purposes. The
estimates of β are interpreted as odds ratios, that is how much does a characteristic
of a property change the probability of ISQ j = 1 purchasing property i over ISQ
j = 1 (in case of βj=1 = 0).
Exponentiating (1), we find that the odds of Yij ≤ j , in other words, the odds of a
response in category j or below, are
γij
1 − γij = λj exp{Xiβ}, (2)
where λj = exp{θj }. The λj may be interpreted as the baseline odds of a response
in ISQ j or below when X = 0. The effect of the covariates X is to raise or lower
the odds of a response in category j or below by the factor exp{X′β}. Note that the
effect is a proportionate change in the odds of Yi ≤ j for all response categories j .
If a certain combination of covariate values doubles the odds of being in category 1,
it also doubles the odds of being in category 2 or below, or in category 3 or below.
Hence the name proportional-odds.
Proportional-odds models can be estimated using maximum likelihood as well.
Interestingly, note that the representation of the proportional-odds model in Eq. 2 is
very similar to a Cox-proportional hazard model (Cox and Reid 1987, 1993). The
2Also, see Donald et al. (2000) and Machado and Mata (2005) for further reading on such non-parametric
models.
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difference, or rather why the proportional-odds and hazard model are the same in this
specific case, is that there is no right censoring. In the sense that all properties will
get sold, because we have a transaction dataset.
Finally, we also add two sets of Gaussian random effects to our hazard model for
every individual property and/or investor. In survival literature, this is also referred to
as frailty (Ripatti and Palmgren 2000). We prefer random effects over fixed effects,
because (1) approximately half of our properties got sold only once in our sam-
ple (meaning we cannot identify the fixed effect), and (2) many (mostly smaller)
investors only invest in 1 market (meaning the market and investor fixed effect are
perfectly co-linear). As a result, we would have to omit a lot of data if we would
use property and investor fixed effects. It is well known from indexing literature that
only including properties that sold multiple times in the data introduces a bias toward
“winners”, or “better” properties, see Abraham and Schauman (1991), Shiller (1993),
Clapp and Giaccotto (1999), Clapham et al. (2006), and Van de Minne et al. (2019)
for more details on this bias. These random effects “capture” all (non time-varying)
unobserved heterogeneity of properties and investors. As shown in Francke and Van
de Minne (2020b), as long as a few properties transact more than once, one can iden-
tify the random effect for all transactions. Such Gaussian random effects are given
by
δki ∼ N(0, σ 2δk ), (3)
where k = {property ID, investor ID}. Given that we have tens of thousands of
individual properties and investors in our data we run in some computational chal-
lenges. To overcome these issues we replace the semi-parametric Cox baseline with
a Weibull distribution. Also, we do not allow for correlation between the random
effects. To increase computation time even further, we estimate these frailty mod-
els using LaPlace Approximation, a fast Bayesian procedure (Rue et al. 2009). More
details on initialization and specifications are omitted here to conserve space, but are
available upon request.
In addition to the role of size, we also assess the role of the type of investor for
robustness purposes. The investor type depends on the institutional setting in which
the investor operates. Those types include public and delegated investors, among oth-
ers. For the modelling of the investor type one might assume some form of ordering
of the data since it is categorical in nature. However, we use the unordered responses,
in the sense that we do not assume that one category of investors is “better” compared
to another. As such we use a multinomial logistic model. Suppose that property i has
probability γ to be bought by type of investor j . The multinomial logistic model is
now given by
γij = exp{Xiβj }
1 + ∑Jj=2 exp{Xiβj }
. (4)
The model can be estimated by maximum likelihood.
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Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our main data provider is Real Capital Analytics Inc (RCA). RCA is a data and ana-
lytics company that focuses particularly on the investment market for commercial
real estate in the United States and various international markets. RCA has been col-
lecting, analyzing, and interpreting comprehensive commercial real estate transaction
information within all investment-grade strata of United States commercial property
asset markets starting in 2000. RCA has a capture rate of over 90% for transactions
of commercial “investable” real estate.3 As a result, the data should be close to the
entire population or commercial real estate properties. Furthermore, RCA employs
hundreds of researchers across the globe to find the ultimate investor of a property as
accurately as possible. For example. RCA knows when a firm bought a property on
behalf of someone else, or if a firm is “simply” a subsidiary / vehicle for a different
firm. This allows us to assign property ownership to the “correct” firm.
In the next subsection we will discuss howwe construct the US real estate portfolio
sizes of all investors in the RCA dataset. In Section “Data and Descriptive Statistics of
the Other Variables”, we discuss the descriptive statistics of the remaining variables
used in this research.
Measuring Investor Size
The main variable of interest is the value of investors’ real estate portfolio. This
allows us to construct the investor size quantiles (ISQ) of both buyers and sellers as
explained in Section “Methodology”. We use two datasets (RCA, and RCA CPPIs) to
construct this value. The RCA CPPIs (or Real Capital Analytics Commercial Prop-
erty Price Indexes in full) are asset price indexes based on a structural time series
repeat sales model given in Van de Minne et al. (2019). The RCA CPPIs are location
and sector (i.e. property types) specific. In total we observe 80 of such RCA CPPIs.
First, we compute the average transaction price and transaction date for every
unique property in the data. Next, we take the index corresponding to the market
(location and property type specific) of the property, and assess the value of the
property in any given year between 2001 and 2018. This gives us a full panel of all
(appraised) property values between 2001 and 2018.
We also know from the RCA data who purchased and sold the property at time of
sale of all the individual properties. This allows to find who owned which property
between what time period. For example, if investor A sold a property in 2005 to
investor B, we know that investor A owned the property before 2005 and investor
B owned said property starting in 2005. There are some complexities though. For
one, in approximately 5.5% of the transactions we find multiple investors (mostly
designated “joint venture”), but we do not know the shares of ownership. In that case
we give equal share of ownership to all investors. In some cases we also find that—
for example—investor A bought a property in 2001, but investor B sold it in 2011.
In this case we split the ownership in the middle, and assume investor B bought the
3In practice, RCA only includes real estate that once in its history sold for more than $2.5 million.
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property in 2006. In less than 4% of the cases did we find a missing transaction in
the middle.
Figure 1 gives the average real estate portfolio size between 2002 and 2018,
together with the 10th and 90th percentile of the portfolio sizes (grey shaded area).
Average portfolio sizes first went up, from $70 million to $120 million, subsequently
crashed and then after 2010, bounced back up again. In 2018 the average US real
estate portfolio sizes are larger compared to its previous (pre-GFC) peak, at over
$160 million. Note that the data is skewed to the right, because there are a few very
large companies that increase the mean. For example, the median is closer to $10-15
million during this period. This is also visible from Fig. 2 by looking at the lower
10th percentile.
Table 1 gives summary statistics of the porfolio sizes by investor type. The first column
gives the investor type. RCA has over 20 categories of investor types. For readabil-
ity, we group them in the remainder of this paper into 4 larger groups (which are
given in bold in Table 1); delegated, public, non-investor and direct. This categoriza-
tion was used in previous literature as well, see for example Ghent (2018). Delegated
investors include pension funds, equity funds, investment managers and banks. Public
investor types include the real estate investment trusts (REITs) and real estate oper-
ating companies (REOCs). REITs and REOCs are under more scrutiny and are more
transparent compared to the other firm types. In addition, these public companies
have long holding periods by statute (Mühlhofer 2019), i.e. they make their money by
collecting rents, and not by buying and selling of real estate. The non-investor group








Fig. 1 Average value of Firm’s US real estate portfolios in $1M between 2002 and 2018. Grey shaded
area in both plots represent the 10th and 90th percentile of said variable per year





Fig. 2 Average Net-Operating-Income per square foot between 2002 and 2018. Grey shaded area in both
plots represent the 10th and 90th percentile of said variable per year
have a group called “direct” which includes developer/owner/operators as well as all
remaining investor types, like high net worth individuals and sovereign wealth funds
(SWFs).
The second column of Table 1 gives how many firms of the corresponding investor
type we identify in our dataset. The third column gives the average size of the firm’s
US real estate portfolio per investor type, our main variable of interest. The fourth
column provides the average value of the individual properties held by each investor
type, and the final column gives how many properties they own on average (again in
2018). Values in different years are available upon request.
Note that the developer/owner/operator (DOO) investor type dominates the RCA
dataset, and especially the “direct” group. Indeed, according to Table 1 the total value
of all the commercial (investable) real estate is $4.7T in 2018 based on the transac-
tions in our sample. The DOO investors own 48% of that. A large proportion of those
DOO investors adopt the Limited Liability Company (LLC) structure which is typi-
cal for private equity funds. Those specialized investors may include family offices
and small developers that act as investors rather than speculative developers. Overall,
we think that those investors adopt the mandate to invest in real estate for invest-
ment purposes and not for owner occupation. Therefore, we think that while DOO
is a broad category, it actually encompasses investors that specialize in investing in
direct real estate. Their assets would almost entirely consist of properties and their
main focus would be real estate investment.
Our summary statistics show that, on average, SWFs have the biggest real estate
portfolios. However, note that only 15 companies are designated SWFs in our data.
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Table 1 Average investor size by investor type (RCA classification and our own in bold) in the year 2018
Investor type Number of Average value Average value Number of
investors of portfolio of real estate properties
Delegated 1, 499 $752, 540, 612 $38, 535, 797 19.5
Pension Fund 91 $1,563,425,522 $ 63,316,298 24.7
Equity Fund 486 $ 1,105,258,068 $ 35,103,609 31.5
Investment Manager 528 $ 740,159,903 $ 40,393,223 18.3
Bank 394 $ 146,768,542 $ 28,221,965 5.2
Public 578 $1, 448, 861, 132 $28, 138, 898 51.5
Traded REIT 268 $ 2,420,689,849 $ 33,521,670 72.2
Non Traded REIT 132 $ 928,560,340 $ 17,178,692 54.1
REOC 178 $ 371,499,382 $ 20,203,755 18.4
Non Investor 2, 877 $70, 204, 113 $18, 080, 497 3.9
Finance 121 $ 95,595,206 $ 19,571,946 4.9
Corporate 1,979 $ 80,656,489 $ 18,419,016 4.4
Government 455 $ 40,046,753 $ 16,981,615 2.4
Non-Profit 322 $ 39,036,490 $ 14,946,195 2.6
Direct∗ 23, 793 $105, 988, 429 $21, 111, 971 5.0
Sovereign Wealth Fund 15 $ 3,539,124,362 $ 78,414,868 45.1
Insurance 125 $ 797,077,974 $ 58,608,675 13.6
Developer/Owner/Operator 22,406 $ 100,303,746 $ 19,992,934 5.0
High Net Worth 835 $ 93,814,870 $ 23,334,947 4.0
Educational 201 $ 90,171,855 $ 28,999,268 3.1
Religious 55 $ 50,627,476 $ 16,095,440 3.1
*The statistics of the investors in the “direct” group do not perfectly sum up to the group’s total. This
is because we omitted smaller investor types from the table for readability, like endowments and CMBS
investors
Their average real estate portfolio is worth over $3B in 2018. They own 45 properties
on average, which are worth almost $80M each on average. This also means that on
average SWFs own the most expensive real estate of all investor types. Non-profit
organisations and governments are the smallest real estate owners on average. Their
real estate is also the cheapest on average (together with religious buyer types) and
have the least amount of real estate in general. Their portfolios are close to $40M on
average in 2018. REITs own on average the most properties, with 72 followed by the
non traded REITs with an average of 54 properties per non-traded REIT. The DOO
investors, even though large by summation, are relatively small per investor. The
average property value they own is almost $20M, and they “only” hold 5 properties
on average in 2018, far less than for example (traded and non-traded) REITs and
equity funds.
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In order to get a feeling of how accurate our estimates of the investor sizes are,
we will now take a detailed look at a selection of investors in the data. Table 2 gives
the top 10 biggest real estate owners according to our estimates 2018. Unsurpris-
ingly, number one is Blackstone with $81 billion in (US) real estate. For comparison,
according to their own reports, Blackstone had $120B in assets under management
(AuM) in real estate world wide in 2018. TIAA is the pension fund with the largest
real estate exposure according to our estimates, with $33B. We also find three REITs
in our top 10, Simon, Vornado, and SL Green. Given that REITs focus their invest-
ments primarily on real estate, the firm’s enterprise value should come close to the
value of the underlying real estate (as valued by the stock market). As an extra
robustness we therefore compare the (log) enterprise value of REITs taken from SNL
Financial with our estimates of the (log) real estate portfolio value for REITs that we
were able to match in Fig. 3. We match the REITs both, on firm and on an year level.
The overlap between our value estimates and the reported enterprise values is not
perfect (Fig. 3), which might be caused by either stock market noise or inaccura-
cies in the RCA data, but overall there is a clear linear relationship between the two
variables. It should be noted that our estimate of the real estate portfolio value is
10% less compared to the reported enterprise values of the REITs on average. This
could indicate that REITs are overvalued (Van Nieuwerburgh 2019) or the other way
around. However there are other explanations as well. First of all, REITs are man-
dated to invest most of its assets in real estate, but not all. More specifically, 75%
of a REITs assets and income should come from real estate. Secondly, we know that
private real estate returns typically lag public real estate returns. Reasons for this
include informational inefficiencies and the slow (double-sided) search / negotiations
in private real estate markets. As a result, previous literature found a lag of some-
where between 6 months to 1,5 years (Barkham and Geltner 1995; Francke and Van
de Minne 2020a). Given that our analyzed time period has mostly been character-
ized by increasing prices, it should result in REITs having higher enterprise values
compared to their contemporaneous private market valuations on average.
Table 2 Top 10 largest owners of US real estate in 2018
Company Portfolio size Type of investor
Blackstone $ 81,401,517,183 Equity Fund
Brookfield AM $ 79,811,188,929 Equity Fund
Simon Property Group $ 42,507,957,360 REIT
TIAA $ 32,794,867,587 Pension Fund
JP Morgan $ 32,740,438,261 Investment Manager
Vornado $ 31,789,241,472 REIT
Irvine Co $ 26,143,141,046 Developer/Owner/Operator
PGIM Real Estate $ 25,295,347,514 Insurance
Starwood Capital $ 23,926,530,059 Equity Fund
SL Green $ 23,312,834,837 REIT
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Fig. 3 Comparison of the (log) value of the real estate portfolios of REITs according to our calculations
(y-axis) and REITs’ enterprise values taken from SNL (x-axis). Blue line represents a linear fit according
to a linear regression model. Every dot represents a specific REIT in a specific year
Data and Descriptive Statistics of the Other Variables
Next we will discuss the transaction data, which is relevant for our analysis. Note that
in Section “Measuring Investor Size” we appraised a full panel of the firm values. In
contrast, the transaction data is a very unbalanced panel of property level transactions.
Properties are only sold once every 7–8 years. Table 3 gives the summary statistics
of our most important variables.
Note that the average investor size quantile (ISQ, both for buyers and sellers) is
46 (the mean is between 1 and 92). This indicates that larger investors transact more
on average. The variables which we believe are important in order to predict prefer-
ences/segmentation are: (1) closeness to the Central Business District, (2) size of the
property (in square feet), (3) the quality of the structure (measured by a “Q score”,
see below), (4) age of the structure, (5) whether the property is green certified, (6)
property type, (7) Net Operating Income of the property at time of sale, (8) market,
and (9) year of sale.
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Table 3 Main descriptive statistics of our data
Mean sd Lower(10%) Higher(90%)
Investor size quantile (buyer) 48.534 26.684 10.000 85.000
Investor size quantile (seller) 52.260 27.172 13.000 89.000
Distance to CBD (in km) 34.640 44.605 5.320 76.927
Square feet (× 1,000) 197.623 227.007 25.920 409.624
Q score 1.518 0.276 1.130 1.890
Age (in years) 28.140 24.235 6.000 51.000
NOI per square foot $11.930 $ 26.190 $ 1.652 $ 23.458






Investor size quantile = a quantile distribution from 1 (lowest) to 92 (highest) indicating the size of the
domestic real estate portfolio of the investors in our data. The quantile score is relative within a year. Q
score = a continuous indicator score between 1 (lowest) and 2 (highest) capturing “unobserved” quality of
properties, essentially based on historic price per square foot compared to its direct peers. Exact method
is proprietary to Real Capital Analytics. NOI = Net Operating Income of the property during the time of
sale. Counts of sales in every year, per buyer type and per metro can be found in the Appendix
We show that the centroid of the closest Central Business District is approximately
35 km (or 22 miles) away on average. The CBD areas are provided to us by RCA. The
average transacted property size is close to 200 thousand square feet, with an average
age of 28 years. RCA also produces so-called “Q scores” for all properties. The exact
methodology is proprietary to RCA, but it in essence is a quantile score between 1
and 2 based on the historic price per square foot as compared to its direct peers (which
is sector and location specific). The average value is therefore unsurprisingly 1.5.
We get the NOI on the date of transaction from two sources. First, for about 35%
of all transactions we observe the property’s NOI directly from the RCA transaction
dataset. However, we also use mortgage data, also tracked by RCA. In many cases,
whenever a property gets refinanced, an “underwritten NOI” is reported. Typically,
there are a few years between the latest refinancing and the sale. We therefore change
the NOI using “NOI indexes” from RCA. The NOI indexes are market (i.e. loca-
tion and property type) specific. In total we observe approximately 300 of such NOI
indexes in the US. This allows us to map an NOI at transaction for 48% of the entire
dataset. NOI is important, because extant literature (Geltner et al. 2014, p. 554–556)
shows idiosyncratic price movement specific to individual assets or granular market
segments, largely reflects the condition of rental (space) markets, as proxied by the
NOI. At the same time, asset-valuation risk reflects changes over time in the capital
market that cause changes in the opportunity cost of capital. Hence, time variation in
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the discount rate causes at least as much volatility in prices (see for example Gelt-
ner and Mei 1995).4 However, the opportunity cost of capital is highly correlated
over time across space markets. Mostly because the risk-free rate, which drives the
cost of capital to a large extent, is identical no matter where the investment is made.
The other determinant of the opportunity cost of capital—the risk premium—can
differ per market, or even property, but rarely changes over time (Geltner and Mei
1995; Geltner et al. 2014). In further analysis we therefore also use time and location
dummies to account for such offsets.
We find that approximately 6% of all properties in our transaction dataset are green
certified. The apartment property type was transacted the most with 38%, and “only”
12% are industrial properties. In the appendix we also provide the distributions over
year of sale (Table 9), location (Table 10) and investor type (Table 11). Given the
often found positive price-volume correlation in real estate (van Dijk et al. 2019; De
Wit et al. 2013), it is not surprising to find that the smallest percentage of transactions
was during the GFC, in 2008–2010 (Table 9). Transaction volume is now higher
compared to the previous, pre-GFC peak in 2007. Real Capital Analytics defines 134
different metro areas, see Table 10. Los Angeles is by far the largest market volume-
wise, with 9.5% of all transactions being in said metro area. New York is second with
over 6% of all transactions. In Table 11 we split the investors by buyer and seller. The
“direct” investor group is again (see Table 1) the largest, being responsible for more
than half of all the transactions.5 The “non-investor” group is the smallest investor
type in our data. Finally, we find that approximately 10% of all transactions are done
by a foreign investor.
Since the variation of the buyer size is our main variable of interest, we will
explore this variable in more detail. First of all, if indeed specific properties are only
bought by specific sized investors, we should find more variation in investor size
in the data as a whole, than within the individual properties. To confirm this, we
first measure the standard deviation of the ISQ within each property ID (if they are
repeated observations). We subsequently order the standard deviations per property
from lowest to highest. Some percentiles based on this ordering can be found in the
second column of Table 4. We also subtract the average standard deviation of the ISQ
of the entire dataset (26.7, see Table 3) from these percentiles in the third column. For
completeness, we redo this exercise with the within investor ID standard deviation
of the ISQ variable. Both property ID and investor ID will also be added as random
effects in the frailty models.
Table 4 confirms that properties tend to be sold to similar sized ISQ investors.
Only at the 83rd percentile is the within property σ ISQ larger compared to the data
as a whole. Within the investor IDs the distribution is even less equal. Only at the
99nd percentile is the within investor σ ISQ larger compared to the data as a whole. In
other words, once an investor is designated large, it will remain relatively large, and
4This phenomenon is also widely accepted in the stock market (Shiller 1981).
5It is best practice to define volume as the amount of transactions (reported here) times the sales prices.
Note that on average, the “direct” investors purchase cheaper properties (Table 1). If we multiply the
average transaction price with the amount of properties sold, the share of direct investors is closer to 40%.
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Table 4 Variation of Investor sizes within sub-groups
Percentiles σ ISQ σ ISQ
Within Difference Within Difference
Property ID within Property ID Investor ID within Investor ID
and full dataset and full dataset
10% 2.121 −24.562 0.000 −26.684
25% 6.364 −20.320 2.121 −24.562
50% 14.119 −12.565 5.433 −21.251
75% 22.627 −4.056 9.195 −17.488
90% 31.820 5.136 14.009 −12.675
Unique obs 29,788 10,251
ISQ = Investor Quantile Distribution; a quantile distribution from 1 (lowest) to 92 (highest) indicating the
size of the domestic real estate portfolio of the investors in our data. The quantile score is relative within
a year
vice verse. Finally, note the final row of Table 4. Here we give the unique amount of
properties and investors. We have 44 thousand observations in total and 30 thousand
unique properties. Thus, most transactions are single sales. On average every investor
was involved with over 4 transactions in the data.
Results
Main Results
Here we discuss the results of our baseline hazard model which can be interpreted
as an ordered multinomial logit model looking at the size of the investors. Our
baseline is the yearly de-meaned quantile distribution of size of the buyers’ real
estate portfolio (ISQbuyer). As discussed in previous sections, this is a variable which
we constructed using the RCA transaction data and is unique in its nature. The
explanatory variables are object characteristics, like size of the property and NOI,
but also seller types. We have four different specifications. In the first (I) model
we do not include any variables on the sellers. The second (II) model includes the
investor size quantile, and model (III) introduces the seller types. We also include
a dummy on whether the seller is a foreign investor or not. The ISQ score enters
in the model with a log transformation. In the fourth (IV) model we enter the ISQ-
score non-barometrically, i.e. we take up a separate dummy for every individual ISQ
(q = 1, 2, . . . , 92) score. The estimates are expected to be somewhat noisy, however
we have enough degrees of freedom to make inferences from the results. All models
have year and metro level fixed effects. The results are given in Table 5.
It should be noted that the interpretation of these results can be less than straight-
forward, other than the sign and significance. A negative parameter estimates, means
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Table 5 Results of our main hazard models. The baseline is the investor size quantile of the buyer
(ISQbuyer)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
A. Main estimates
ln ISQseller −0.254*** −0.246*** Fig. 8
ln dist to CBD −0.002 0.007 0.008 0.010*
ln structure size −0.418*** −0.338*** −0.336*** −0.338***
Green −0.058** −0.054** −0.054** −0.041*
ln Q score −0.973*** −0.847*** −0.872*** −0.872***
ln age 0.076*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.089***
ln NOI per square foot −0.233*** −0.200*** −0.197*** −0.198***
B. Property type fixed effects
Apartment (ref ) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Industrial −0.437*** −0.398*** −0.386*** −0.394***
Office −0.132*** −0.111*** −0.100*** −0.103***
Retail −0.415*** −0.376*** −0.362*** −0.353***
C. Seller type fixed effects
Delegated (ref ) 0.000 0.000
Direct 0.034*** −0.049***
Non Investor −0.048** −0.115***
Public −0.053*** −0.024
Foreign −0.068*** −0.101***
D. Other fixed effects
Year fixed effects    
Metro fixed effects    
E. Diagnostics
loglik −420,145 −419,206 −419,173 −418,822
AIC 840,607 838,730 838,672 838,150
Concordance 0.688 0.698 0.699 0.700
Wald test 11,163 14,131 14,119 14,278
N 43,928 43,928 43,928 43,928
∗∗∗ = significant within the 1% level. ∗∗ = significant within the 5% level. ∗ = significant within the 10%
level
The Wald test indicates whether the final coefficients differ from the initial values. ref = reference
category, CBD = closest Central Business District, as defined by Real Capital Analytics. NOI =
Net-Operating-Income
that larger (ISQ) investors are more likely to purchase the property, and the other
way around. For example, the parameter estimate on the (log) size of the structure
is negative and statistically significant in all model specifications, meaning that the
larger the property, the larger the buyer on average. In contrast, older properties are
more likely to be bought by smaller investors, all things equal as can be seen by the
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positive and significant effect of the log of the age of the property. Most parame-
ters have the expected sign. Green properties, high Q score properties, and high NOI
per square foot properties are more likely to be bought by largest investors. The dis-
tance to the closest CBD is mostly insignificant, or barely significant. This might
seem surprising, but note that we control for metro fixed effects and property level
NOI. Especially the latter is expected to be somewhat colinear with distance to CBD
(i.e. properties further away from the CBD will have lower NOI per square foot).
Apartment (industrial) properties are sold to the smallest (largest) investors, all things
equal. Finally, even after controlling for the type of seller, we find that the size of the
seller (ISQseller) has a significant impact on the buyer size. In all models we find that
the larger sellers, tend to sell to larger buyers.
Again, even though the signs of the parameters are interesting in itself, it is diffi-
cult to get an intuition on the actual magnitude of the impact of said variables. We
will therefore visualize the change in baseline (i.e. the probability distribution func-
tion (pdf)) for a specific set of linear combinations of covatiates. More specifically,
we can make a “representative” property (Diewert et al. 2011; de Haan and Diewert
2011). This “average” property can serve as an overall benchmark. It has the average
characteristics of the sample of all properties in the RCA database. Its values can be
found in Table 3. This property is a mix of 38% apartment, 25% office, 25% retail
and 11% industrial, it is 200,000 square feet, 28 years old, has an NOI of $12 thou-
sand per square foot, and is 34 km away from the CBD. We subsequently run said
covariates through our model estimates to get a pdf of buyers of that representative
property. The pdf of buyers for Models (I) through (IV) is given in Fig. 4.6
Even though the models include very different covatiates, on average the pdfs are
indistinguishable from each other. Indeed, in all cases small investors have relative
small probability of purchasing this “average” benchmark property, but the same goes
for the very large investors to the right of the pdf. The investor quantile most likely to
purchase this average property has an ISQ score around the 50 mark for all models.
In the remainder of this section we take this benchmark property, but change a
few property characteristics to see how much the pdf changes/skews. For example,
we can take a few existing properties within the RCA dataset, and view the estimated
probability to be sold to any investor size. We also include an online Appendix to this
paper where one can simulate how changes to the covariates impact on the distribu-
tion of investors based on the size. Table 6 gives three examples of actual transactions
in the RCA dataset. All estimates are based on Model (I), as for now we are not yet
interested in sellers’ characteristics.
The first property is an old office property in the suburbs of Los Angeles. The
property is up for redevelopment, and has no NOI as of the transaction date. Its a
relatively small property (51 thousand square feet) and has the lowest Q score possi-
ble. Our model overwhelmingly predicts that a small investor would be interested in
this property. The actual buyer was of the lowest category, i.e. the ISQbuyer = 1. The
6These estimates can be a bit “noisy”. We therefore smooth the line using a Kalman filter with a local
linear trend (Francke and van de Minne 2017). After the smoothing we re-weigh the points so they sum
up to one again.
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Fig. 4 Probability density function of buyers’ ISQ for the “benchmark” property for all our Models. This
property has the average characteristics of all properties in the RCA dataset. The horizontal axis is the ISQ
score of the buyers, and the vertical axis is the probability that a specific ISQ will purchase the property.
These probabilities always add up to 1
middle panel is an apartment complex in Phoenix. The property has average scores
throughout, and was bought (in 2006) by a mid-tier investor with an ISQ of 47. Our
model also predicts that investors with a median portfolio size have the largest proba-
bility of purchasing this property. Finally, the third panel gives an industrial property,
with a relatively low NOI per square foot. The property is younger than average,
and has a Q score that is slightly above average with 1.71. However, our model pre-
dicts that only large investors are interested in this property. This is mostly caused
by the fact that this is one of the largest properties in the dataset with 1.2M square
feet. Above results can be explained in several ways. One the one hand, the find-
ings are indicative of potential financing constraints as the small-sized buildings are
predominantly bought by small investors and the large buildings by large investors.
Small investors may face financial constraints to buy large and hence more expen-
sive7 buildings. On the other hand, investors may prefer to buy certain buildings as
7Expensive means buildings with low cap rates and high transaction prices. While this paper does not
look at prices as such, we use this term rather descriptively. Buildings with high NOI are also classified as
expensive.
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they choose to adopt different investment styles. For example, small investors may
adopt a value-add or opportunistic strategy by buying properties with low Q score
and low NOI, then refurbish those and benefit from the capital gains. Large investors
instead may be interested in the so called ‘core’ buildings which tend to be large and
more expensive. They may be more interested in stable cash flows instead.
A useful outcome of above exercise is that we are able to pin down what a core,
a value-add and an opportunistic building may look like if we want to keep work-
ing with the common terminology. The property characteristics associated with core
buildings may vary depending on the sorting of investors across properties. Looking
at which properties get bought by the top end of the pdf—the large players—can help
us identify what core is for those investors. One example is the real estate displayed
at the bottom panel in Table 6. In our example, a very large young industrial building
with high quality and high overall NOI. A value-add property may look like the real
estate displayed in the middle panel. And an opportunistic—at the top panel. The lat-
ter is a small old office building with very low NOI and the lowest possible quality.
It is still located in a major city—Los Angeles—but it is away from the CBD.
In Fig. 5 we keep the average representative property, as given in Fig. 4, however
we change two characteristics: (1) NOI per square foot, (2) and square footage itself.
More specifically, we look how investors sort themselves across properties varying
the combination of low/high NOI and small/large structures. The combination of low
and small is designated to be at the 15th-percentile of investor size. That is associated
with $5.09 NOI per square foot, and 39 thousand square feet. That means that small
investors would buy the small properties with low NOI per square foot all else equal.
The high/large property is designated to be bought by the 75th-percentile ISQ. That
us associated with an NOI per square foot of $16.26 and 258 thousand square feet.
From Fig. 5 we can clearly see that the largest “jump” comes from the building size.
Even at a low NOI per square foot, larger investors still prefer larger properties. It
does drop off a little for the very largest investors, although it should be noted that
the total amount of NOI (NOI per square foot times the square footage) is twice as
high for the combination of low NOI and large building ($1.3M), compared to the
high NOI and small building combination ($0.6M). That means that large buildings
have larger NOIs per square foot than smaller buildings.
Next we are interested in some of the time-varying effects associated with buyer
preferences. For this we use our benchmark property again but we change two vari-
ables. The first is the NOI per square foot. This is a variable that is affected by the
economic environment of that year. We use the means that are shown in Fig. 2. The
second variable we change are the year dummies, to correspond with the year of inter-
est. By doing this, we can see if the preference for the same property changes over
time, by holding the other characteristics of said property fixed. We are specifically
interested in the GFC period which spands from 2007 to 2009, for reasons we will
show below. Because we are still not interested in the seller characteristics, we show
the results of Model (I), although other models remain very similar and are available
upon request. The results for a selection of years are given in Fig. 6.8
8Note again that we demean the full panel of investors in the first step in Section “Data and Descriptive
Statistics” but we do not demean the ISQ scores in the transaction data. This is important because otherwise
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Table 6 Three different properties and its probability to be sold to different investors sizes (ISQbuyer). All
estimates are based on Model (I)
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Fig. 5 Probability density function of buyers’ ISQ for the “benchmark” property, using the average charac-
teristics as found in Table 3. The only variable we change are the Net Operating Income (NOI) per square
foot and the square footage itself (Sqft). Low (high) means its the variable at the 15% (75%) percentile as
found in the data, ordered from low to high values. All estimates are based of Model (I)
What is interesting about Fig. 6 is that most of the changes of the distribution of
buyer ISQs during the GFC is only affecting the higher ISQ investors. Note that the
pdfs always sum to one. Thus, one cannot say that the probability of sale changed
from one year to the next, as all results are to be interpreted within the confines of
the given year. That being said, it is evident that the larger investors “pulled out”
of the real estate market, compared to other investor sizes. Instead, the probability
that the average property was bought by lower and mid-tier investors increased. The
opposite picture is observed just prior to the crisis, with the largest investors being
the most likely to purchase the average property. In 2009, the probability that a large
investor would purchase the average property was at a historic low. (Since then, the
probability has gone up again, but not as high as the immediate pre-GFC levels.)
Above observations are somewhat counter-intuitive as one would expect that the
large investors have the least credit constraints and in a crisis period would be the
the mean of the ISQ scores per year would always be (92/2 =) 46. However, we might demean the full
panel of investors, but if only smaller investors purchase properties, we will find a low ISQ score on
average for that year. That is why we can track changes in investor sizes over the years.
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Fig. 6 Probability density function of buyers’ ISQ. Property is the “average” benchmark property, using
the average characteristics as found in Table 3. The only variables that are changed are the NOI per square
foot, see to Fig. 2, and the time dummies to the corresponding year. The results are for three years during
the Great Financial Crisis, 2007 (green) 2008 (orange) and 2009 (grey). All estimates are based of Model
(I)
predominant player on the markets. Clearly, they were the ones that actually have
reduced the likelihood of buying the benchmark property. That finding suggests that
they seem to be the most responsive ones to an economic downturn by deciding not
to trade on the real estate market. An economic downturn may therefore be associ-
ated with the largest investors more strongly lowering trading activity than small and
medium investors. This can be because large players wait for the real estate mar-
ket to recover before they start buying or selling. They may be the least flexible to
manoeuvre the GFC market and find good deals. Alternatively, those investors may
struggle to justify a transaction during the GFC for their shareholders or lenders. This
is because large investors (1) are subject to more stringent regulatory requirements,
(2) may be listed on the stock exchange and subject to more scrutiny from sharehold-
ers, (3) or/and have strong dependence on issuing bonds and hence be wary of their
credit ratings. Pension funds and insurance companies may have been affected by the
introduction of new financial market regulations in the US and in Europe (i.e. Dott
Frank, Basel III, Solvency II, etc.). REITs may face devaluation of their assets and as
a result may find it harder to refinance and prefer not to opt for new stock issuance.
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Independently from which channel dominates, the conclusion is that being a large
investor and potentially having established good and cheap financing structures does
not result in increased or even a continued trading activity in a downturn. This may
be associated with a shock to liquidity for those large players. Smaller players may
face financing constraints and illiquidity too but it seems they are more agile during
a crisis and keep trading activity going. That can be linked to style investing—small
investors look for opportunistic properties and the possibility for such deals increases
in a downturn. The fact that the small players continue to trade in the GFC suggests
against the presence of a financing constraint channel that explains the pdf of ISQs.
Above findings suggest that the potential effects of a change of the market compo-
sition of buyers and sellers may lead to overall lower prices in addition to any other
downward pressure on prices during the GFC. That means that the presence of large
investors and their diminishing likelihood to transact during a downturn and their
higher likelihood to transact in a growing market can exaggerate the real estate cycle.
The presence of small players may have the opposite effect on the real estate market
and can help smooth the cycle.
This is also buttressed by looking at the expected buyer sizes per state for a selec-
tion of years, see Fig. 7. The expected buyer size is the sum product between the
probabilities and the ISQ score of the pdfs. To construct Fig. 7 we first construct an
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 7 Average expected size of the buyer based on Model (I) per state for a selection of years. The darker
the color, the more probable a larger investor while be the buyer. Grey states include those states for
which we have less than 10 observations per year. The representative property is the “average” benchmark
property per state. We subsequantly only change the average NOI per square foot and the time dummy
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average benchmark property per state. The average structure size, property type dis-
tribution, etc., is thus different for every state. Next, we change the average NOI per
square foot per state per year, and the year of sale dummy. These estimates are still
based on Model (I). States with less than 10 observations per year are omitted, and
are given in grey.
We find that in 2017, the distribution of expected buyer sizes across states is
approximately similar to that in 2003, albeit a bit less concentrated in New York
and Chicago (Illinois). In fact, the largest investors in 2017 can be found in DC and
Massachusetts (dominated by Boston metro). Just pre-GFC in 2007, we find that the
average size of investors increased. It did so quite in-discriminatory. In other words,
larger investors become more active in almost every market. Two of the exceptions
are the states of Michigan and Utah (dominated by Detroit and Salt Lake City respec-
tively) where the average investor size actually went down. More interestingly, the
state of New York (dominated by New York City) also saw decreases in average
investor sizes between 2003 and 2017. States that saw its investor sizes increase
the most between 2003–2007 were Wyoming, Ohio, Kentucky, and Alabama. These
are states that are not typically known to attract large institutional investors. In the
build-up to the GFC hence there seems to have been a shift of large players moving
away from the more established commercial real estate markets into states with pre-
viously less institutional grade properties. That may have been due to a search for
yield and better investment opportunities. At the end of the GFC, large institutional
investors reduced their real estate investments in most states. In fact, none of the states
had an average increase in institutional investor sizes. The largest drop in investor
size between 2007–2009 was in Connecticut, followed by Ohio. Large institutional
investors found their way back to real estate in 2017, although not equally in every
state. States that only saw a small increase (none of the states had a decrease between
2009–2017) were Wyoming, Indiana, Missouri. In levels, the smallest investors can
be found in South Carolina in 2017.
Next, we are interested in the size of the sellers‘ US real estate portfolios
(ISQseller). In models (II) and (III) we include the log of the ISQ of the seller. In model
(IV) we use a dummy for every of the 92 ISQ categories of the sellers instead. The
estimates of the dummies are graphically given in Fig. 8. Note again in Table 5 that
the estimates on the covariates hardly change between the models, so earlier results
still hold for these models as well. Here we are mostly going to discuss the added
variables on the sellers.
For models (II) and (III) we both find a negative effect of the log of the sellers’
ISQ on the buyers’ ISQ, meaning larger sellers sell to larger buyers, holding all things
equal. Model (IV) gives a similar image. Even though the estimates can be a bit
“noisy” at times, overall it is clear that the larger the sellers’ ISQ, the larger the
buyers’ ISQ. If there would be no preference to trade with a specific size of investor,
these dummies should be insignificantly different from zero. The results are very
robust.
Next we compare the effect the sellers’ size has on the probability to sell it to
a buyer of a certain ISQ. For this we again use the benchmark property. The only
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Fig. 8 Non parametric dummy estimates of ISQ seller quantiles, ISQseller=1 is the reference group and
fixed at zero. Grey bars give the 95% confidence bounds. The estimates come from Model (IV)
parameters we change are the sellers’ ISQ. More specifically, we are going to com-
pare the buyers ISQ pdf when the sellers’ ISQ is 15 versus 75. We do this for all the
models (II through IV) that include the ISQseller variable.
Even though the parametrization is very different between the models (two include
a log transformed ISQ score, and in the other ISQ is entered non-parametrically), the
results are very similar. The results are presented graphically in Fig. 9. In all cases
we find that if the seller has an ISQ of 15, i.e. the seller is small, it is likely to sell
to a smaller investor on average. The average ISQbuyer is expected to be 44. This is
compared to when the seller is large, i.e. they have an ISQ of 75, in which case the
average expected ISQbuyer is approximately 50 on average. Again note that it is the
same property in both cases, and the same investor type. The main difference is—
similar to our GFC analysis in Fig. 6—in the high ISQ buyers. The probability that
a smaller investor will sell the same property to a large investor is relatively slim.
Large investors overwhelmingly sell to other large investors, irrespective of the type
of investor. These findings align with what has currently been observed in the indus-
try where investors within the same size and background sell to each other. Above
findings suggest that the real estate market is segmented and investors trade with each
other in separate brackets depending on their size. That may be due to established
networks within a given investor sub-market and familiarity with the players. Large
sellers are mostly selling the average property to large buyers while small sellers can
sell to a range of buyers but the likelihood to sell to the biggest buyers is very small.
It is important to keep in mind that in each of those scenarios, we are dealing with
the same property and not with larger or smaller properties depending on the size of
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Fig. 9 Pdf of expected buyer ISQ. Property is the “average” benchmark property, using the average
characteristics as found in Table 3. The only variable that is changed is the sellers’ ISQ
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the seller. That may suggest that the large sellers mostly sell properties within their
network and that the network effect is stronger for the very large investors.
Finally, we will shortly discuss the model diagnostics. The differences in the con-
cordance score (Harrell et al. 1996) between models (I) through (IV) are negligible
although the likelihood and AIC do improve after introducing sellers characteristics.9
The AIC prefers the third model, but the likelihood the fourth model. The Wald test
shows that all parameter estimates are different from their starting value.
Robustness: Frailty and Prior Exposure
Next we will discuss two sets of auxiliary results. First we will discuss our hazard
models with frailty for individual properties and investors. These results can be found
in Table 7. In Model (V) we only include the property level random effects, in Model
(VI) only the investor level random effect, and Model (VI) contains both random
effects.
Only including the random effects for the properties does not alter the results
erratically. It seems in general that there is not much unobserved heterogeneity with
this set of covariates, evident from the low standard deviation on the random effects
(σk=property id = 0.006, see Table 7). Only the green certification and the dummy for
direct investor seller type become insignificant. Including the investor random effects
does attenuate most of the results. For example, none of the seller type variables are
significant anymore. Also the effect of Q-score reduces, but is still highly significant.
The coefficients on property types also reduce considerably. This can be explained
by the fact that most investors tend to focus on one sector, thus the investor random
effect effectively controls implicitly for property types. The same argument can be
used to explain why the age variable becomes insignificant; Investors tend to focus
on specific vintages. Interestingly, the effect of NOI per square foot and the size of
the structure remain very robust. The effect of the prior investor size (ISQseller) stays
highly significant, but is attenuated as well. All of this is very encouraging, given the
low amount of variation we found within investors’ ISQ (Data and Descriptive Statis-
tics of the Other Variables) and the fact that the standard deviation on the investors
random effects is quite large (σk=investor id = 3.2 and 3.5, see Table 7) for both mod-
els with the investor random effects. Finally, the fit—according to the marginal log
likelihood—is best for the model with both random effects included.
Next, we decide to swap out our dependent variable—ISQ—with a variable for
how much prior exposure the investor had in a specific market before the transaction.
We—again - use the 80 market definitions provided to us by RCA (which are location
and sector specific), and compute the dollar value the investor already had in said
market prior to the transaction, as a percentage of the total value of the investors’
real estate portfolio. As with the ISQ, we make quantiles of this variable by grouping
investors who had less than 5% of their portfolio in a market and 95% or more in
a market, and with 1% increments in between, resulting in—again—92 quantiles.
9The concordance test gives the probability that the prediction x goes in the same direction as the actual
data y. The value will therefore be between 0 and 1, with 1 being the best fit possible.
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ln ISQseller −0.234*** −0.123*** −0.114***
ln dist to CBD −0.001 −0.007 −0.007
ln structure size −0.291*** −0.251*** −0.233***
Green −0.019 0.033 0.031
ln Q score −0.711*** −0.243*** −0.222***
ln age 0.062*** 0.007 0.006
ln NOI per square foot −0.165*** −0.190*** −0.180***
B. Property type fixed effects
Apartment (ref ) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Industrial −0.301*** −0.074** −0.067**
Office −0.087*** −0.081*** −0.073***
Retail −0.242*** −0.030 −0.029
C. Seller type fixed effects
Delegated (ref ) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Direct 0.019 −0.003 −0.003
Non Investor −0.088*** 0.008 0.008
Public −0.035** −0.003 −0.003
Foreign −0.034* −0.045** −0.042*
D. Other fixed effects
Year fixed effects   
Metro fixed effects   
E. Diagnostics
m. loglik −203,828 −177,566 −177,360
α 1.850 4.458 4.359
σk=property id 0.006 – 0.006
σk=investor id – 3.188 3.463
N 43,928 43,928 43,928
∗∗∗ = significant within the 1% level. ∗∗ = significant within the 5% level. ∗ = significant within the 10%
level
m. loglik is that marginal log likelihood. Parameter α gives the shape of the Weibull distribution of the
baseline. ref = reference category, CBD = closest Central Business District, as defined by Real Capital
Analytics. NOI = Net-Operating-Income
We call this variable PEX. This variable is of interest to us, as it highly relates to
the ISQ variable. The downside is that it is heavily endogenous, and we therefore
cannot simply add it to our main specifications. Indeed, only larger investors have
the capacity to diversify. For this reasons we estimate a separate model and see if our
findings are consistent. The results are given in Table 8.
D. Cvijanović et al.
Table 8 Results of our main hazard models. The baseline is the prior exposure (as a % of its entire
portfolio) in the market where the transaction takes place of the buyer (PEXbuyer)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
A. Main estimates
ln PEXseller −0.064*** −0.058*** 
ln dist to CBD 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024***
ln structure size 0.222*** 0.207*** 0.205*** 0.203***
green 0.052** 0.040* 0.041* 0.040*
ln Q score 0.765*** 0.726*** 0.733*** 0.737***
ln age −0.081*** −0.085*** −0.086*** −0.086***
ln NOI per square foot 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.008
B. Property type fixed effects
Apartment (ref ) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Industrial 0.271*** 0.255*** 0.247*** 0.247***
Office 0.071*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.052***
Retail 0.306*** 0.286*** 0.281*** 0.280***
C. Seller type fixed effects
Delegated (ref ) 0.000 0.000
Direct −0.030** −0.028**
Non investor 0.072*** 0.076***
Public 0.038** 0.038**
Foreign −0.040** −0.041**
D. Other fixed effects
Year fixed effects    
Metro fixed effects    
E. Diagnostics
loglik −422,986 −422,768 −422,752 −422,703
AIC 846,288 845,854 845,830 845,912
Concordance 0.631 0.638 0.639 0.639
Wald test 5,298 5,722 5,757 5,826
N 43,928 43,928 43,928 43,928
∗∗∗ = significant within the 1% level. ∗∗ = significant within the 5% level. ∗ = significant within the 10%
level
The Wald test indicates whether the final coefficients differ from the initial values. ref = reference
category, CBD = closest Central Business District, as defined by Real Capital Analytics. NOI =
Net-Operating-Income
Note that the results of our PEX model mirrors the findings of our main models in
Table 5. The reason being is that larger investors tend to have less prior exposure on
average per market because they are relatively diversified. Thus a positive estimate
on ISQ, translates to a negative estimate in the PEX model.
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From our results, we find that investors with little prior exposure in a market tend
to purchase properties that are larger, green certified, high Q score, closer to the CBD
and of low age. These properties are arguably more informationally efficient (Geltner
and van de Minne 2017), and tend to be “safer”/core investments. This could also
explain partly why larger investors tend to go with these larger properties. Investors
with a lot of prior exposure also tend to purchase apartments, whereas industrial and
retail is more likely to be bought by investors with less prior exposure to the market.
As was the case with the ISQ variables, we also find that the sellers’ prior exposure
(PEXseller) explains the prior exposure of the buyer. “Local” investors (high PEX)
tend to sell to other “local” investors, and the other way around as documented by
the significant coefficient of PEXseller in Models (II)–(IV). The only estimate that is
inconsistent with previous findings is that of NOI per square foot. This estimate is
insignificant for all models, whereas it had a large impact on ISQ.
Even though we will not show all the pdfs you can make from the results in
Table 8, we do want to highlight one of the results. Figure 10 gives the pdf of the
“average” representative property being bought by an investor with little prior expo-
sure for different years. Little experience is defined as having less than 5% of its
portfolio in the target market prior to the transaction. We find that on average, our
representative property has a 13%–14% change of being bought by an investor with
little experience in that market. This number is relatively stable for the different years.
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Fig. 10 Probability that the “average” representative property gets bought by an investor in a market that
is “new” to this investor for a selection of years. Our definition of “new” is when the investor owned less
than 5% of its portfolio (= the PEX variable) in the target market before the transaction. The results are
based on the estimates of Model (I)
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could mean that during the crisis investors were more afraid to invest in markets they
did not know well.
Robustness Results by Investor Type
Finally, we present alternative estimations based on the multinomial logistic regres-
sion model and looking at investor types instead of size. Our dependent variable is
categorical and consists of the four investor groups we constructed in Section “Data
and Descriptive Statistics”. We use the same explanatory variables as in the baseline
model (I). The actual estimation results, with model fit and significance can be found
in the Appendix, see Table 12. The marginal effects of the estimated coefficients can
be found in Table 13. Note that the rows always sum up to zero by construct.
Starting with the delegated investor, we find that they prefer large, high Q score,
high NOI, green certified, young properties, close to the Central Business District
(CBD). A negative coefficient for CBD means that the further away the property is
from the closest CBD, the lower the probability a delegated investor will purchase it.
In terms of the Q score, for every 1% increase in it, the probability that a delegated
investor will purchase the property, increases by 0.15%. In other words, delegated
investors are interested in “A-class” stabilized properties, essentially “cash-cows”.
Delegated investors also prefer industrial properties the most as compared to the
other investor types. Those industrial properties mostly consist of logistics centers
and warehouses. Delegated investors are also the ones most likely to buy real estate
from foreign sellers.
Public investors fit that profile to a large extent as well. Indeed, they also prefer
large properties (positive coefficient on structure size, with 0.025), young properties
and high Q scores. Compared to direct and the non-investor groups they also value
high NOI per square foot more, but not as much as delegated investors. This effect
is insignificant (Table 12). In contrast to delegated investors, public investors care
less about proximity to CBDs. In general we find that public investors are spatially
well diversified, as is to be expected. Relatively speaking, public investors buy less
of buildings which have green certification. Also, they are most likely to buy retail
properties.
Direct investors seem to have the complete opposite preferences compared to del-
egated or public investors. Compared to those investors, they buy smaller properties,
with low Q scores, that are older, with relative low NOI per square foot. In other
words, the direct investors are more opportunistic and seek to add value. They are
most likely to purchase apartments. The non-investors are middle of the road in
almost all categories. Compared to the other investor types they are not interested in
particularly large or small, high or low Q score properties.
Finally, we will discuss the bottom panel of Table 13. Here we find the esti-
mates for the seller type. The results indicate that—holding all things equal—direct
investors are most likely to purchase from other direct investors; non-investors buy
mostly from non-investors; public investors have the highest probability to buy their
real estate from other public investors. Only delegated investors mostly buy from an
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other category of investors different to theirs, namely the public firms. However, their
second favorite seller are other delegated investors.
In summary, we find that in the absence of investor size (ISQ), investor type
has been used to sort investors across properties. Larger, high quality properties are
mostly sold to delegated and public firms. This is in line with our findings about large
investors.
Furthermore, we find that investors tend to trade within their own investor type,
holding constant for the property quality. This means that even if another type of
investor had a property with the same characteristics—investors would choose to buy
from the same category as theirs. This may be due to network effects—investors
within the same category belong to the same networks and may feel more accustomed
to do business with familiar players. We will not test the channel at hand in this
paper but it remains for future research to identify the mechanisms behind this sorting
between buyers and sellers.
Concluding Remarks
This paper uses novel micro-level data on commercial real estate transactions to
assess market segmentation by firm size.
Considering the specifics of commercial real estate as an asset class such as low
transparency, high capital intensity, indivisibility, high transaction costs, illiquidity,
the paper provides evidence for market segmentation by investor size. Investor size
is a latent variable which has not been directly observed previously due to the lack of
available data. To estimate the size of an institutional investor we look at the proper-
ties they have purchased over a considerably long time period and compute the value
of their real estate portfolios.
We then group investors into different size quantiles to assess the probability that
a property is bought by a certain investor size. Following Donald et al. (2000) we
estimate the quantile model in a survival framework. We find evidence of market
segmentation by investor size. The main observation is that the probability that a
large seller (small) will sell a property to a similar-sized buyer is higher. Moreover,
large institutional investors tend to buy larger properties, properties with higher NOI,
properties with higher quality, younger properties, and properties located closer to
the CBD. The opposite is true for small investors. The observed segmentation can
be attributed to investor preferences rather than financial constraints as evident by
analysis of NOI. During the GFC, large investors were less likely to buy an average
property, as compared to the period before or after the crisis. Moreover, the size of the
average investor declined across all states during the GFC. This finding implies that
the presence of large institutional investors may exacerbate a downturn in property
values, as small investors would be rather interested in lower NOI properties. Further
implications of our findings call for a more efficient matching of buyers and sellers
by estate agents given that the market does not operate as an auction. This could
potentially increase the efficiency of the real estate markets overall.
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Appendix
Table 9 Year of sale distribution


















Table 10 Locational distribution
Metro % Count Metro % Count Metro % Count Metro % Count
Akron 0.12% Brevard Co 0.18% Houston 3.12% Pittsburgh 0.25%
Albany 0.06% Buffalo 0.16% Huntsville, AL 0.12% Polk Co 0.17%
Albuquerque 0.22% Charleston 0.22% Indianapolis 0.60% Portland 1.11%
Others - AR,LA 0.22% Charlotte 1.67% Jackson, MS 0.07% Portland, ME 0.03%
Others - CT 0.01% Chattanooga 0.11% Jacksonville 0.98% Providence 0.23%
Others - DE, 0.30% Chicago 3.66% Kansas City 0.62% Provo 0.04%
MD,VA,WV
Others - FL 0.17% Cincinnati 0.56% Knoxville 0.15% Raleigh 1.50%
Others - GA,NC, 1.62% Cleveland 0.37% Los Angeles 9.53% Reno 0.25%
SC,TN,KY
Others - ID, 0.05% Co Springs 0.44% Lansing 0.07% Richmond 0.49%
MT, WY
Others - IL, 0.64% Columbia 0.31% Las Vegas 1.72% Rochester 0.09%
IN, OH
Others - MI,WI 0.27% Columbus 0.78% Lexington 0.08% Sacramento 1.31%
Others - MN 0.08% Corpus Christi 0.08% Little Rock 0.10% Salinas 0.07%
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Table 10 (continued)
Metro % Count Metro % Count Metro % Count Metro % Count
Others - MS,AL 0.43% Dallas 4.36% Louisville 0.25% Salt Lake City 0.45%
Others - New 0.20% Dayton 0.14% Madera, CA 0.00% San Antonio 0.77%
England
Others - NJ 0.02% Daytona Beach 0.17% Madison, WI 0.08% San Diego 2.17%
Others - 0.23% DC Metro 3.57% Martin/St Lucie 0.08% Santa Barbara 0.09%
Northern CA
Others - 0.33% Denver 2.80% McAllen 0.03% Sarasota 0.27%
Northwest
Others - NY 0.12% Des Moines 0.09% Memphis 0.66% Savannah 0.08%
Others - OK,TX 0.55% Detroit 0.63% Miami/So Fla 2.79% Seattle 2.50%
Others - PA 0.27% Eastern PA 0.07% Milwaukee 0.49% San Francisco 5.14%
Others - Plains 0.40% El Paso 0.09% Minneapolis 1.15% Spokane 0.05%
States
Others - 0.04% FL Panhandle 0.27% Modesto 0.25% St Louis 0.63%
Southern CA
Others - 0.28% Fort Collins 0.13% Myrtle Beach 0.09% SW Florida 0.05%
Southwest
Allentown 0.16% Fort Myers 0.25% Naples 0.13% Syracuse 0.05%
Ann Arbor 0.06% Fresno 0.18% Nashville 0.92% Tallahassee 0.20%
Atlanta 5.02% Gainesville 0.09% New Haven 0.15% Tampa 1.89%
Austin 1.18% Grand Rapids 0.08% New Orleans 0.11% Toledo 0.10%
Bakersfield 0.11% Greeley, CO 0.04% Norfolk 0.36% Trenton, NJ 0.06%
Baltimore 0.90% Greensboro 0.40% New York 6.24% Tucson 0.54%
Baton Rouge 0.09% Greenville 0.44% Oklahoma City 0.28% Tulsa 0.20%
Birmingham 0.36% Harrisburg 0.15% Omaha 0.17% Wichita 0.05%
(AL)
Boise 0.07% Hartford 0.25% Orlando 1.62% Winston 0.18%
Boston Metro 1.76% Hawaii 0.07% Philadelphia 1.48%
Boulder 0.19% Honolulu 0.10% Phoenix 5.12%




Non investor 0.021 0.052
Public 0.145 0.141
Foreign investor 0.130 0.088
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Table 12 Results from the Multinominal Logistic regression. Dependent variable are the different buyer
types as found in bold in the column headers. The direct investor is the reference group
Delegated Non investor Public
(Intercept) −12.499*** −4.331*** −15.147***
ln dist to CBD −0.019 −0.022 0.113***
ln structure size 0.846*** 0.033 0.878***
green 0.213*** −0.288** −0.219***
ln Q score 1.245*** −0.089 3.574***
ln age −0.008 −0.017 −0.214***
ln NOI per square foot 0.442*** −0.164*** −0.021
Property type fixed effects
Apartment (ref ) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Industrial 0.802*** 2.398*** 1.814***
Office 0.444*** 1.997*** 1.740***
Retail 0.048 1.318*** 2.271***
Seller type fixed effects
Delegated (ref ) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Direct −0.409*** −0.006 −0.170***
Non Investor −0.047 0.439*** 0.382***
Public 0.313*** 0.510*** 0.216***
Foreign 0.063 0.068 −0.175***
Other fixed effects and diagnostics
Year   
Metro   
Likelihood −63,932
N 43,928
*** = significant within the 1% level, ** = significant within the 5% level, * = significant within the
10% level
ref = reference category. CBD = Central Business District, as defined by Real Capital Analytics. NOI =
Net-Operating-Income at time of sale.
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Table 13 Marginal effects of our Multinomial Logit Model. Dependent variable are the different buyer
types as found in bold in the column headers. Parameter estimates can be found in the Appendix in Table 12
Direct Delegated Non Investor Public
ln dist to CBD (km) −0.0011 −0.0077 0.0004 0.0084
ln structure size (in square foot) −0.1173 0.0961 −0.0041 0.0253
Q score −0.3302 0.1508 −0.0009 0.1803
ln age 0.0188 −0.0081 −0.0010 −0.0097
ln NOI per square foot −0.0435 0.0577 −0.0077 −0.0065
green −0.0273 0.0410 −0.0047 −0.0091
Property type fixed effects
Apartment (ref ) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Industrial −0.2489 0.1218 0.0304 0.0967
Office −0.1727 0.0604 0.0322 0.0801
Retail −0.1372 −0.0161 0.0280 0.1254
Seller type fixed effects
Delegated (ref ) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Direct 0.0325 −0.0404 0.0042 0.0037
Non Investor 0.0048 −0.0187 0.0082 0.0057
Public −0.0662 0.0502 0.0080 0.0080
Foreign −0.0034 0.0140 0.0012 −0.0118
Year fixed effects    
Metro fixed effects    
ref = reference category. All investor explanatory variables refer to the seller type. CBD = Central Business
District, as defined by Real Capital Analytics. NOI = Net-Operating-Income at time of sale
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